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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD LYLE HOBBS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020146-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court properly reject defendant's proposed jury 
instructions stating that a defendant's good faith belief the victim owed 
him money is a complete defense to aggravated robbery? 
'"A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction presents a question of law, which 
[this Court] review[s] for correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court.'" 
State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted). A trial court's 
statutory interpretations are reviewed under the same standard. State v. Barrick, 2002 UT 
App 120,14,46 P.3d 770. 
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding evidence concerning 
whether the victim had a practice of underpaying his employees as 
irrelevant to defendant's aggravated robbery charge? 
"[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is 
relevant, and [this Court] will find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion.'" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7 (citation omitted). 
III. Did the trial court's two jury instructions providing the statutory 
definitions of aggravated robbery and robbery adequately instruct the 
jury on the elements of aggravated robbery? 
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury is a question of law, which this 
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f 11,17 P.3d 1153. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following pertinent statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 2, 2001, defendant was charged by information with aggravated burglary, 
a first degree felony; aggravated robbery, a first degree felony; and aggravated assault, a 
second-degree felony (R. 1-2). The aggravated burglary charge was dismissed at 
defendant's preliminary hearing (R. 21-23; R. 177:5). Following a jury trial, defendant 
was convicted of both aggravated robbery and aggravated assault (R. 160; R. 179:288). 
The trial court then held that defendant's aggravated assault conviction merged into his 
2 
aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced defendant to five years to life in prison (R. 
169-170, 171 -172). Defendant timely appealed (R. 174). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On June 29,2001, defendant entered his former employer's office wanting to 
collect back wages he claimed he was owed (R. 178:91-92,93,94,106,107,188). When 
the employer, Myke Hughes, began to dispute defendant's claim, defendant pulled a gun 
on him, pointed it at his head from about fifteen feet away, and said, "things are over with 
for you" (R. 178:94). Terrified, Hughes threw some papers into the air and ran out of the 
building (R. 178:98). Defendant chased Hughes down the street, continuing to brandish 
his gun, until police arrived (R. 178:112-13,130,137,166-67,174,177,179-80). He 
then dropped his gun in some bushes and fled (R. 178:117,142,174,180). Three hours 
later, defendant presented himself to the police, identified himself as John Doe, and said, 
"Here I am, I did i f (R. 178:148). Defendant added, "Mike owes [me] $815 and when [I] 
get[] out Mike will pay" (R. 178:148). 
Defendant's defense. Prior to trial, defendant proffered a claim-of-right 
defense—that he was "innocent of robbery, because his efforts to collect his wages were 
legitimate, and not unlawful,... because he had no intent to take Hughes' property, but 
only wanted to collect his own" (R. 129-130; see also R. 178: 60-61). In support of this 
lrThe facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79,12, 34 P.3d 187. 
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defense, defendant sought to present evidence concerning Hughes's payroll practices to 
show that defendant had "a bona fide belief that he had been shorted in his pay" (R. 
178:62). He also sought various jury instructions stating that he could not be convicted of 
aggravated robbery if he "had a good faith belief that he was entitled to the money sought, 
even if . . . he was mistaken in this belief, and even if . . . [he] knew it was wrong to use 
force to collect the debt or perceived debt" (R. 136,167). 
After argument, the trial court concluded that People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 
P. 492 (Utah 1895), a case recognizing a common law claim-of-right defense to robbery, 
had been superceded by the 1973 criminal code (R. 178:67,161-62). It then concluded 
that the criminal code did not provide a claim-of-right defense to robbery (R. 178:161-
62). Thus, the court excluded any evidence of the victim's payroll practices as irrelevant 
and rejected defendant's proposed jury instructions (R. 178:67-68,160-62,163). 
At the beginning of trial, the jury was instructed that "being owned money by 
someone does not mean that you have the right just on your own without any legal 
process to come in and take whatever money there may be at the place of business" (R. 
178:71). Thus, although "you'll hear evidence of what was said because that forms a part 
of understanding what motive [defendant] may have had for doing what he may have 
done,.. . it is not for you to decide whether he was owed money" (R. 178:71-72). 
At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed that defendant was guilty of 
aggravated robbery if "defendant, while in the course of committing robbery . . . [d]id use 
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a dangerous weapon . . . [k]nowingly and intentionally" (R. 142; Jury Instr. 3). It was 
then instructed that "[r]obbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted taking 
of personal property from another, from his person or in his immediate presence, by 
means of force or fear" (R. 143; Jury Instr. 4). Finally, the jury was instructed that "I can 
not assert as a defense to a charge of robbery that I believe that the other person owes me 
money" (R. 143; Jury Instr. 4). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury that a 
person who acts under a bona fide belief that he is owed money cannot be convicted of 
aggravated robbery even if his belief is mistaken and even if he knows it is wrong to use 
force to collect a debt. However, defendant's claim rests on a common law claim-of-right 
defense that was abolished upon re-enactment of the criminal code in 1973. Because 
nothing in the current code recognizes such a defense to robbery, defendant's claim fails. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded evidence 
concerning the victim's business practices because that evidence was relevant to support 
his claim-of-right defense and to establish the victim's motive and bias in accusing him of 
aggravated robbery. Because no claim-of-right defense exists in Utah, the trial court 
properly determined the evidence was irrelevant and thus inadmissible for that purpose. 
Because defendant never sought admission of the evidence to establish motive and bias, 
5 
and indeed rejected the trial court's suggestion that he might, defendant waived this part 
of his claim below. 
Issue III. Defendant claims the trial court's aggravated robbery instruction was 
erroneous "because it did not contain the elements of robbery, but simply inserted the 
word robbery into the general aggravated robbery elements instruction/' However, this 
Court will not find error in a trial court's jury instructions if the instructions as a whole 
adequately inform the jury of the law upon which the case must be decided. In this case, 
the court set out the statutory elements of aggravated robbery in Jury Instruction 3. Jury 
Instruction 4 then defined the statutory elements of robbery. Because these instructions 
together adequately informed the jury of the applicable law, no error occurred. 
Defendant also claims the trial court's robbery instruction was erroneous. He 
claims first that it was erroneous because "it omitted the element that the taking was 
intentionally and knowingly unlawful." Because proof that "the taking was intentionally 
and knowingly unlawful" is not an element of robbery, this part of defendant's claim 
fails. Defendant has no right to jury instructions that misstate the law. 
Defendant claims second that the robbery instruction was erroneous because it 
"added the nonexistent element that there was no good faith defense to a charge of 
robbery." However, "discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing appropriate 
conclusions from the testimony depend[s] on discharge of the judge's responsibility to 
give the jury the required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria." 
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Here, defendant argued in closing that he should be acquitted of aggravated robbery 
because "he just want[ed] to get paid" and "he made some bad choices [with] a gun." 
Based on this argument, the trial court properly reminded the jury that "I can not [sic] 
assert as a defense to a charge of robbery that I believe that the other person owes me 
money." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS STATING THAT A 
DEFENDANT'S GOOD FAITH BELIEF THE VICTIM OWED HIM 
MONEY IS A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in not giving his proposed jury instruction 
that "if you find that [defendant] had a good faith belief that he was entitled to the money 
sought, even if you find that he was mistaken in this belief, and even if you find that [he] 
knew it was wrong to use force to collect the debt or perceived debt, you must acquit 
[him] of the aggravated robbery charge." Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing R. 136); Aplt. Br. at 19-
21. First, defendant argues that the term "unlawfully" in the robbery statute requires 
proof that he acted "with felonious intent" as that term was defined at common law, 
thereby incorporating his common law claim-of-right defense. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. 
Second, he argues that the claim-of-right defense provided by statute to theft also applies 
to robbery. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Neither of defendant's arguments withstands scrutiny. 
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A criminal defendant has the right to have his '"theory of the case presented to the 
jury in a clear and understandable way.'" State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 
1997) (quoting State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981)), ajf'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 
1998). However, he is "not entitled to an instruction that 'does not accurately state the 
applicable law.'" Id. (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 799 (Utah 1991)). 
A. Preliminary point: clarification of the issue. 
Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery based on his use or threatened use 
of a dangerous weapon "in the course of committing robbery" (R. 142; Jury Instr. 3). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(a) (1999). Under section 76-6-301, a person may commit 
robbery in two different ways, if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to 
take personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of 
force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a 
theft. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999). Here, however, the jury was not instructed on the 
definition of robbery contained in subsection (b). Rather, the jury was instructed only on 
the definition contained in subsection (a) (R. 143; Jury Instr. 4). Thus, the only issue 
properly before this Court is whether a claim-of-right defense exists to robbery charged 
under section 76-6-301 (l)(a). This Court need not decide whether a claim-of-right 
defense exists to robbery charged under section 76-6-301 (l)(b). 
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B. The trial court correctly rejected defendant's claim that 
Hughes's common law claim-of-right defense to robbery 
survived the 1973 amendments to the criminal code. 
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court erred in ruling that the adoption of the Utah 
Code superceded Hughes in the context of robbery, because the robbery statute continues 
to require proof of... an unlawful... taking of personal property in the possession of 
another," and thus "the government is still required to prove animus furandir Aplt. Br. at 
19-20,21. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
In 1895, the supreme court of the territory of Utah decided People v. Hughes, 11 
Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (1895), the only Utah case ever to recognize a claim-of-right defense 
to robbery. Hughes held that the defendant, who had used a gun to take money lost in an 
allegedly corrupt card game, could not be convicted of robbery because, "'[w]hen [a 
person] takes the property under a bonafide impression that the property belongs to him, 
he commits no robbery, for there is no animus furandi.'" Id. at 494 (quoting State v. 
McCune, 70 Am. Dec. 188). 
At the time, however, robbery was defined under common law as "the felonious 
and forcible taking, from the person of another, of goods or money to any value, by 
violence, and putting him in fear." Commonwealth v. White, 19 A. 350, 350 (Pa. 1890); 
see also Boles v. State, 22 S.W. 887, 887 (Ark. 1893); Simmons v. Smith, 25 So. 881, 882 
(Fla. \m);Statev. Wasson, 101 N.W. 1125,1126(Iowa 1905); Commonwealth v. 
Davis, 66 S.W. 27,27 (Ky. App. 1902); Houston v. Commonwealth, 12 S.E. 385, 386-87 
9 
(Va. 1890). Under this definition, the taker only had the requisite felonious intent, or 
animus furandi, if he knew 'that the property was not his own; that it belonged to another; 
that he had no legal right to take it." Meed v. State, 41 N.W. 277,278 (Neb. 1889); see 
also State v. Rechnitz, 52 P. 264,265 (Mont. 1898). 
Until 1973, the definition of robbery in Utah was essentially identical to the 
definition at common law. See State v. Pass, 515 P.2d 612,613 n.l (Utah 1973) (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-1 as defining robbery to be "the felonious taking of personal 
property in the possession of another, from his person, or immediate presence, and against 
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear"); State v. Donovan, 77 Utah 343, 294 P. 
1108,1109 (Utah 1931) (same). Arguably, then, the claim-of-right defense available 
under Hughes was also available under these statutes. 
However, "[i]n an effort to rationalize, clarify, and improve upon the frequently 
archaic common law definitions of crimes, the legislature in 1973 repealed wholesale all 
the prior substantive criminal statutes (including, necessarily, defenses) and enacted a 
sweeping new penal code that departed sharply from the old common law concepts." 
State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 632 (Utah 1986). 
As part of this process, the legislature explicitly abolished all common law crimes. 
See 1973 Utah Laws 586, ch. 196, § 76-1-105 (providing that "[c]ommon law crimes are 
abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute 
or municipal ordinance"). It also, almost as explicitly, abolished all common law 
10 
defenses. See 1973 Utah Laws 585, ch. 196, § 76-1-103 (providing "[t]he provisions of 
this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any 
offense defined in this code") (emphasis added). 
Finally, the legislature amended the robbery statute to replace the common law 
term "felonious taking" with the requirement only that the taking be done "unlawfully and 
intentionally." 1973 Utah Laws 615, ch. 196, § 76-6-301. 
Despite the clear intent of these amendments to divorce the criminal code from 
common law, cf Tuttle, 730 P.2d at 632, defendant nonetheless claims that the term 
"unlawfully" within the robbery statute has the same meaning as did the term "with 
felonious intent" at common law, and thus, includes a claim-of-right defense. He fails, 
however, to cite the one case most on point, State v. Durant, 61A P.2d 638 (Utah 1983), 
which defeats his claim. 
In Durante the supreme court rejected the view that the word "unlawfully" within 
the current aggravated arson statute incorporated the common law defense that a person 
did not commit arson if he burned his own property. 
Prior to 1973, the aggravated arson statute required that a person act "maliciously" 
before he could be convicted of arson. Durante 61A P.2d at 642 n.l. Under the common 
law, "maliciously" required "that 'the burning be done to injure another... or the 
property of another.'" Id. (citation omitted). Thus, one who burned his own property 
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without attempting to injure another was not guilty of arson. Durant, 61A P.2d at 639; Id. 
at 647-50 (Stewart, J. Joined by Hall, C.J., dissenting). 
In 1973, however, the legislature amended the aggravated arson statute to remove 
the term "maliciously" and replace it with "unlawfully." Id. at 642 n. 1. 
Despite the 1973 amendment, Durant claimed that he was not guilty of aggravated 
arson because the owner of the home he had burned had given him permission to burn it. 
Id. at 639. In support of his claim, Durant "pointfed] to the word 'unlawfully' in the 
statute" and argued that that term encompassed his ownership defense. Id. at 640. "The 
defendant's only justification for this construction [was] that it preserves the common law 
concept of arson." Id. 
The supreme court rejected Durant's claim. Noting both the legislature's recent 
abolition of the common law and its simultaneous removal of the common law term, 
"maliciously," from the aggravated arson statute, the court refused to "contriv[e] a 
definition of 'unlawfully' in order to superimpose common law notions on the plain 
words of the statute." Id. at 641, 642 n. 1. Rather, the court interpreted the term 
"unlawfully" to mean "without justification, license or privilege," and then turned to 
codified law to determine whether such justification, license or privilege existed. Id. at 
641; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1999) (providing "provisions of this code shall 
govern the construction of . . . defenses against any offense defined in this code); State v. 
12 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1983) (holding only defenses available are those 
specified by statute). It found that none did. Durant, 61A P.2d at 642. 
Durant is directly applicable here. In 1973, the legislature removed the common 
law term "felonious taking" from the robbery statute. It simultaneously abolished all 
common law crimes and instructed that the code would be the source of all defenses. See 
1973 Utah Laws 585, 586, 615. In light of these amendments, defendant's attempt to 
"contriv[e] a definition of 'unlawfully9 in order to superimpose common law notions on 
the plain words of the statute" fails. Durant, 674 P.2d at (AY, 642 n.l. 
Consequently, the trial court properly rejected defendant's claim. 
C. The statutory claim-of-right defense available for theft does not 
apply to robbery. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected his 
proposed jury instructions because the claim-of-right defense provided by statute to theft 
applies to robbery. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Defendant's claim fails as a matter of statutory 
construction. 
"When faced with a question of statutory construction, [this Court] look[s] first to 
the plain language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 
(Utah 1997) (citation omitted). Statutory terms are interpreted "'according to their 
commonly accepted meaning unless the ordinary meaning of the term results in an 
application that is either unreasonably confused, inoperable,... or in blatant 
13 
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'" State ex. rel L.P., 981 P.2d 848, 850 
(Utah App. 1999) (citations omitted). 
In addition, this Court "assume[s] that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly," Stephens, 935 P.2d at 520 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and 
"that the expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another," Biddle v. 
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, f 14,993 P.2d 875. 'Therefore, omissions in 
statutory language should 'be taken note of and given effect.'" Id. (quoting Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217,219 (1973)). 
Finally, this Court "read[s] a statute to harmonize it with related statutes." State ex 
rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091,1097 (Utah App. 1997). 
1. Relevant statutes. 
Title 76 , Chapter 2, Parts 3 and 4 of the Utah Code set forth general defenses to 
and justifications excluding criminal responsibility. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-301 to -
307; 76-2-401 to -406 (1999). Neither part provides a general claim-of-right defense. 
Title 76, Chapter 6 is entitled "Offenses against Property." Section 76-6-101 sets 
out provisions generally applicable to the chapter. Id. § 76-6-101 (1999). Section 76-6-
101(3) provides that, "[f]or purposes of this chapter[,].. .'[property' is that of another, if 
anyone other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest in any portion 
thereof." Id. Nothing in this section provides a general claim-of-right defense to offenses 
against property. 
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Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3 is entitled "Robbery." Section 76-6-301(a), under 
which defendant was convicted, provides that a person commits robbery if he "unlawfully 
and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another 
from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear." Id. 
§ 76-6-301(b) (1999). Nothing in this part provides a claim-of-right defense to robbery. 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4 is entitled "Theft." Section 76-6-404 provides that "[a] 
person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Id.. § 76-6-404 (1999). Section 76-4-402 
provides: 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed 
prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the 
property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in 
the property or service stolen if another person also has an 
interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or 
service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to 
obtain or exercise control over the property or service 
as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or 
service honestly believing that the owner, if present, 
would have consented. 
A/. § 76-6-402 (1999). 
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2. Analysis 
Section 76-6-402(3)(a), by its plain terms, applies only to charges brought under 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3)(a) (providing that "[i]t is a 
defense under this part that the actor... [a]cted under an honest claim of right to the 
property or service involved."). Robbery is not included within Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 
4. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (defining robbery). Thus, under the plain language of 
section 76-6-402(3)(a), the claim-of-right defense provided therein does not apply to 
robbery. 
Moreover, section 76-6-402(3)(a) indicates that "the Utah Legislature clearly knew 
how to make" a claim-of-right defense available when it wanted to. State ex rel A.B., 
936 P.2d at 1098. Yet, no such defense appears within those parts of the code addressing 
generally applicable defenses and justifications. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-301 to -
307, 76-2-401 to -406. Nor does such a defense appear within that section of the code 
addressing those provisions generally applicable to crimes against property. See id. § 76-
6-101. Nor does such a defense appear within that part of the code specifically 
addressing robbery. See id. § 76-6-301 to -302. Such omission, which must "'be taken 
notice of and given effect/" Biddle, 1999 UT 110, at J 14 (citation omitted), indicates the 
legislature's intent not to provide a claim-of-right defense to robbery. Cf. State ex rel 
A.B., 936 P.2d at 1098 (giving force to legislature's failure to include rehabilitation as 
factor for consideration under serious youth offender act where legislature's inclusion of 
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rehabilitation as factor under other statutes indicated legislature knew how to include 
such factor when it wanted); State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233,1235 (Utah App. 1991) 
(Orme, J., concurring in result) (discussing statute defining when state may appeal in 
criminal cases). 
Finally, public policy supports the legislature's decision. A claim-of-right defense 
to robbery, which "encourag[es] people to take the law into their own hands or to use 
violence or self-help," State v. Schaefer, 790 P.2d 281,283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), is 
'""not only... lacking in sound reason and logic, but . . . utterly incompatible with and 
ha[s] no place in an ordered and orderly society such as ours,'"" State v. McMillen, 925 
P.2d 1088,1090-91 (Haw. 1996) (quoting People v. Hodges, 496 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-74 
(App. Div. 1985) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 305 A.2d 800, 802 (N.J. App. Div. 1973)); see 
also State v. Martin, 516 P.2d 753, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).2 
2In fact, despite defendant's contention otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 19 (citing 
outdated edition of Lafave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law), since at least the early 
1960's, the clear modern trend has been to reject a claim-of-right defense to robbery, 
especially where the claim relates to debt collection. See, e.g., Ashley v. State, 606 So.2d 
187, 190 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (no defense); Whitescarver v. State, 962 P.2d 192, 195 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Schaefer, 790 P.2d at 284; Bartlett v. State, 765 So. 2d 799, 801 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); McMillen, 925 P.2d at 1091; State v. Miller, 622 N.W.2d 782, 
787 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); Smith v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 266,268 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1979); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d 308, 316-320 (N.J. 1995); Fletcher v. State, 364 P.2d 
713, 721 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961); Commonwealth v. Sleighter, 433 A.2d 469,471 (Pa. 
1981); see also People v. Uselding, 247 N.E.2d 35, 37 (111. Ct. App. 1969) (no defense to 
debt collection); People v. Reid, 508 N.E.2d 661, 662, 664 (N.Y. 1987); Martin, 516 P.2d 
at 756; Frazier v. State, 342 S.W.2d 115,116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961); see also People v. 
Tufunga, 987 P.2d 168,174-75 (Cal. 1999) (no defense to debt collection unless involves 
specific property owed); Crowder v. State, 527 S.E.2d 901, 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); 
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Defendant claims, however, that "[e]ven if the legislature's intent to permit a good 
faith defense to robbery were questionable, the court recently recognized . . . in 
distinguishing [the] offenses of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, tha t . . . 
"aggravated robbery always requires proof that the defendant took another's property "' 
Aplt. Br. at 21 (quoting State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 862 (Utah 1996)) (emphasis in 
defendant's brief). Moreover, he continues, "[t]he idea that § 76-6-402 applies strictly to 
theft offenses is . . . refuted by the fact that in interpreting the [statute], the Utah Supreme 
Court has not limited its application to theft charges, but has found the portion of the 
statute containing the presumption about possession of recently stolen property applicable 
to other crimes." Aplt. Br. at 21 (citing State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978)). 
Neither Brooks nor Sessions help defendant. 
First, defendant appears to assumes that Brooks's statement that "aggravated 
robbery always requires proof that the defendant took another's property," see Brooks, 
908 P.2d at 862, necessarily means that the State must prove the other person actually 
owned the property taken. However, such an interpretation of Brooks ignores section 76-
6-101(3), which provides that, "[f)or purposes of this chapter[,]... *[p]roperty' is that of 
State v. Larsen, 596 P.2d 1089,1090 (Wash. 1979); State v. Winston, 295 S.E.2d 46, 51 
(W.Va. 1982); Austin v. State, 271 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Wis. 1978). 
This is so even where a claim-of-right defense to theft exists. See Reid, 508 
N.E.2d at 662, 664 (holding statutory claim-of-right defense to larceny does not apply to 
robbery; concluding "that if the Legislature intended to excuse forcible taking, it would 
have said so."); Bartlett, 765 So. 2d at 801; McMillen, 925 P.2d at 1091; Miller, 622 
N.W.2d at 797; Smith, 587 S.W.2d at 268; Mejia, 662 A.2d at 316-20. 
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another, if anyone other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest in any 
portion thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(3). Under this definition, then, "proof that 
the defendant took another's property," see Brooks, 908 P.2d at 862, may be established 
either by proof that the other actually owned the property taken or by proof that he merely 
possessed it. Thus, nothing in Brooks requires recognition of a claim-of-right defense. 
Finally, even assuming arguendo, as defendant contends, that Sessions requires 
application of section 76-6-402's theft defenses to robbery, section 76-6-402(2) within the 
same statute renders such application a nullity. Section 76-6-402(3)(a) provides that "[i]t 
is a defense [to theft] that the actor... [a]cted under an honest claim of right to the 
property or service involved." Id. § 76-6-402(3)(a). However, section 76-6-402(2) 
provides that "[i]t is no defense [to theft] that the actor has an interest in the property or 
service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to 
infringe." Id. § 76-6-402(2). As discussed above, another person has such an interest if 
he "has a possessory or proprietary interest in any portion thereof." Id. § 76-6-101(3). 
Here, it is undisputed that the victim had a possessory interest in the property defendant 
sought. Thus, even if Sessions requires application of section 76-6-402 to crimes other 
than theft, section 76-6-402(2) of that statute defeats any possible claim-of-right defense 
under section 76-6-402(3)(a). 
For all of the above reasons, defendant's reliance of the claim-of-right defense to 
theft fails. Thus, the trial court properly rejected defendant's claim-of-right instructions. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE CONCERNING WHETHER THE 
VICTIM HAD A PRACTICE OF UNDERPAYING HIS 
EMPLOYEES AS IRRELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding 
evidence concerning the victim's allegedly dishonest business practices. Aplt. Br. at 22. 
According to defendant, "[t]he trial court should have permitted him not only to present 
the evidence of wages owed to [him] to support his good faith defense/' but also should 
have permitted him to present evidence "of Hughes' history of extremely dishonest and 
unlawful business dealings with his employees [which] bore directly on his motive in 
accusing Hobbs of robbery in the midst of a pay dispute." Aplt. Br. at 23,25. 
Because no "good faith defense" to robbery exists, the trial court did not err in 
excluding the evidence on that basis. To the extent defendant claims the evidence was 
admissible as relevant to the victim's motive and credibility, defendant affirmatively 
waived this claim below when he rejected the trial court's offer to consider the evidence 
on this basis. 
A. Proceedings below. 
Before trial, defendant requested a ruling on the admissibility of the victim's 
business practices under rule 406, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 178:60). Defendant 
claimed the victim's "payment practice is relevant" to the robbery charge because of his 
defense that he had "a bona fide belief that he had been shorted in his pay" (R. 178:62-
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63). After concluding that Utah did not recognize a claim-of-right defense to robbery, the 
court ruled that the evidence defendant sought was irrelevant and, thus, not admissible (R. 
178:68). 
After the State's sixth witness, defendant re-iterated his objection to the trial 
court's exclusion of evidence concerning the victim's business practices. Defendant 
stated: "I think limiting the evidence he can put on in terms of what was going on, what 
were his thoughts and beliefs that would go to his (inaudible) and mental state, I think it's 
a violation of his rights that he can't put on what he believes to be his theory of the case." 
(R. 178:159). The trial court reaffirmed its ruling (R. 178:160-62). 
After defendant testified, defendant again raised the issue of the victim's business 
practices. This time, however, defendant claimed the evidence was relevant not only to 
support a good faith defense but because "it also goes to credibility" since "[s]omebody 
who is consistently not paying consistent with the hours that their employee works . . . 
lends itself to somebody who is credible or to credible, truthful or not truthful, and it's a 
form of cheating" (R. 178:214-15). The trial court ruled that "you can't bring it in for 
that purpose. The rules are very clear. We don't get to create mini trials within trials . . . 
because they have to do with credibility The only way you get in credibility 
testimony is in opinion or reputation form" (R. 178:215). Defendant raised no objection, 
but rather indicated, "I understand" (R. 178:215). 
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The trial court then noted, however, that if defendant's defense was "that this 
whole thing was a setup by Mr. Hughes and that what happened is Mr. Hughes had been 
cheating him and then in order to avoid paying him set him up for a robbery charge,... 
then maybe you can get in to all of that, but it commits you to a pretty, quote 'fantastic,' 
unquote, defense" (R. 216). "But you [defense counsel] have never told me that that's a 
defense you're running here" (R. 178:216). "So I would suggest that you decide with 
[defendant] whether that's what you want to run and if you do then I'll talk about whether 
we can get into the billing practices" (R. 178:216). 
After consulting with defendant, defense counsel explained that the court's prior 
summation of defendant's defense "is inconsistent with what it is" (R. 178:221). In fact, 
the picture [defendant] wanted to paint was this is a business that 
consistently mismanages funds, doesn't pay employees correctly, has 
problems as a result of that with the Internal Revenue Service or 
other disputes, employees complaining about missing wages, and 
that when he stood in that office that day and threatened a lawsuit, 
some of Mr. Hughes' reaction to that was overreaction based on his 
[being] upset about the situation in general and about his threats of 
suing him . . . . 
. . . The connection would be that when [defendant] was 
standing in the [victim's] office . . . arguing with him about the 
payroll situation and threatening to sue him and threatening to 
contact the Internal Revenue Service or whomever, that that was 
already a sensitive subject, that that pushed somebody who was 
already involved in ongoing disputes by employees . . . , over the 
edge. That he was somebody who was very sensitive to that 
complaint because he had heard it quite a bit and that that's partial 
basis for his overreaction that day. 
(R. 178:222-24). 
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After hearing defendant's explanation, the court ruled that the business practice 
evidence was not admissible. The court explained that, although the evidence 
may all tend to show a special sensitivity on Mr. Hughes' part,... it 
does so at the cost of a considerable amount of time, introducing the 
potential for confusion of the issues, delay, and.. . some possible 
prejudice, I guess, to Mr. Hughes I just think that if it has any 
relevance it's not sufficient to justify the risk of confusion, unfair 
prejudice to Mr. Hughes, and the time that we'd consume in doing it. 
(R. 178:226). 
B. The trial court properly ruled that evidence in support of a non-
existent defense is irrelevant and therefore not admissible. 
Defendant claims that the trial court "should have permitted him . . . to present the 
evidence of wages owed to [him] to support his good faith defense." Aplt. Br. at 23. 
However, as discussed in Point I, supra at pp. 7-19, Utah does not recognize a good faith 
claim-of-right defense to robbery. Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that evidence 
in support of that defense was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. See Utah R. Evid. 
402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."); State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 
|^ 13, 973 P.2d 404 ("[WJhere the proffered evidence has no probative value to a fact at 
issue, it is irrelevant and is inadmissible under rule 402."); State v. Stewart, 925 P.2d 598, 
600-01 (Utah App. 1996). 
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C. Defendant waived any claim that the evidence was admissible to 
show bias, motive, or credibility where he affirmatively told the 
court that his defense was not based thereon. 
Defendant claims that the trial court should have permitted him to present 
"evidence of Hughes' history of extremely dishonest and unlawful business dealings with 
his employees" because it "bore directly on his motive in accusing [defendant] of robbery 
in the midst of a pay dispute" and would have "expos[ed] Hughes' bias in accusing 
[defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 23,25. Defendant claims the evidence was admissible under 
rules 404, 608(c), and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 23-26. 
However, defendant never sought admission of the challenged evidence on this 
basis. At no point below did defendant ever mention motive or bias as a basis for 
admitting the evidence, nor did he ever argue that the evidence was admissible for that 
purpose under rules 404,608(c) or 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Thus, defendant 
waived this claim below. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 11,10 P.3d 346 ("As a general 
rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."). 
Moreover, when the trial court told defendant that it would consider admitting the 
evidence if defendant's defense was "that this whole thing was a setup by Mr. Hughes 
and that what happened is Mr. Hughes had been cheating him and then in order to avoid 
paying him set him up for a robbery charge," defendant specifically stated, after 
consultation with counsel, that the defense suggested by the court "is inconsistent with 
[what defendant's defense] is" (R. 178:216, 221, 223-24). Yet, this is the very defense 
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defendant now raises on appeal. This court will not consider claim on appeal if defendant 
"led the trial court into committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d, 1201,1220 (Utah 
1983). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S TWO JURY INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDING 
THE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
AND ROBBERY ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
THE ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court's aggravated robbery instruction was 
incorrect, because it did not contain the elements of robbery, but simply inserted the word 
robbery into the general aggravated robbery elements instruction/' Aplt. Br. at 35. 
Defendant further claims that the trial court gave an "inaccurate robbery definition 
instruction, which omitted the element that the taking was intentionally and knowingly 
unlawful, and which added the nonexistent element that there was no good faith defense 
to a charge of robbery." Aplt. Br. at 35. Defendant's claims are frivolous. 
Jury instructions "must accurately and adequately inform a criminal jury as to the 
basic elements of the crime charged." State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1993). 
However, "[j]ury instructions must be evaluated as a whole to determine their adequacy." 
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 13, 18 P.3d 1123. Thus, '"[tjhis court will affirm 
when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly tender the case to the jury [even where] one 
or more of the instructions, standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have 
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been.9" Id. (quoting State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT App 295, H 9, 13 P.3d 1060 (further 
citation omitted)) (brackets in original). 
Here, jury instruction 3 provided: 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements 
are as follows: 
COUNT I: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
1. That on or about June 29,2001, defendant, while in the 
course of committing robbery, 
2. Did use a dangerous weapon, 
3. Knowingly and intentionally. 
(R. 142;JuryInstr.3). 
Jury instruction 4 then provided: 
Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted 
taking of personal property from another, from his person or in his 
immediate presence, by means offeree or fear. 
Personal property means anything of value other than land. I 
can not [sic] assert as a defense to a charge of robbery that I believe 
that the other person owes me money. 
(R. 143: Jurylnstr. 4). 
Defendant contends first that Jury Instruction 3 was inadequate because "it did not 
contain the elements of robbery, but simply inserted the word robbery into the general 
aggravated robbery elements instruction/' Aplt. Br. at 35. However, defendant did not 
object to Jury Instruction 3 on this basis below (R. 179:243-53). Thus, this claim is 
waived. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346 ("As a general rule, claims not 
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.")- In any case, where Jury 
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Instruction 3 mirrored the language of the aggravated robbery statute, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302, and the very next instruction explained the elements of robbery, defendant's 
claim fails. State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396-97 (Utah App. 1994) (finding no error 
where one jury instruction "mirrored the language of the theft statute" and "the other jury 
instructions adequately instructed the jury" on the meaning of "intent to deprive" within 
that instruction)). 
Defendant next contends that Jury Instruction 4 was inadequate because it "omitted 
the element that the taking was intentionally and knowingly unlawful" and "added the 
nonexistent element that there was no good faith defense to a charge of robbery." Aplt. 
Br. at 35. 
Concerning defendant's first contention, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (l)(a) 
provides person commits robbery if "the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or 
attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear." Nothing in the statute 
requires that the person intend or know that his taking is unlawful. Thus, the trial court 
did not err in not including that language in its robbery instruction. See State v. Alonzo, 
932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 1997) (holding defendant is "not entitled to an instruction 
that 'does not accurately state the applicable law'") (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 799 (Utah 1991)). 
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Concerning defendant's second contention, the trial court did not add any 
"nonexistent element" to robbery in Jury Instruction 4. Rather, it merely re-iterated a 
preliminary instruction given earlier that "being owed money by someone does not mean 
that you have the right just on your own without any legal process to come in and take 
whatever money there may be at the place of business" (R. 178:71). As discussed supra 
at pp. 7-19, this is a correct statement of the law. Moreover, the trial court appropriately 
instructed the jury on this issue where defendant's aggravated robbery charge was based 
on his use of force during an attempt to collect wages allegedly owed, and defendant 
argued in closing that the jury should acquit him of aggravated robbery because "he's not 
going there to rob anybody, he's not going there with the intention of harming anybody, 
he just wants to get paid" (R. 179:278) and "he made some bad choices He had a 
gun, they were fighting" (R. 179:279). See State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah 1981) 
("'Discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing appropriate conclusions from the 
testimony depend[s] on discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the jury the 
required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria.'" (citation omitted)). 
Consequently, defendant's jury instruction claims fail.3 
3Because defendant's claims raise no errors by the trial court, the State does not 




Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence. 
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For purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Property" means any form of real property or tangible personal 
property which is capable of being damaged or destroyed and includes a 
habitable structure. 
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer, railway 
car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging or assembling persons or 
conducting business whether a person is actually present or not. 
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the actor has a 
possessory or proprietary interest in any portion thereof. 
(4) "Value" means: 
(a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at the 
time and place of the offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the 
market value; or 
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of 
repairing or replacing the property within a reasonable time following 
the offense. 
(5) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained by 
the criteria set forth in Subsections (a) and (b) above, the property shall be 
deemed to have a value less than $300. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(DA person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily iiyury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory expla-
nation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the 
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for 
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
